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During wartime, Congress is more willing to defer to the
president on matters both foreign and domestic.
It is widely acknowledged that the president is more able to pursue their policy agenda during wartime, but
how extensive is this advantage? Based on their research, William Howell and Jon Rogowski argue that not
only is Congress’s cooperation with the president’s agenda during wartime much broader than has been
previously thought, but this also extends to domestic policy issues as well as foreign ones. They also find that
this cooperation dries up as wars conclude, something that President Obama should now expect with an end
to conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the scaling back of the ‘war on terror ’. 
When all is said and done, two themes may def ine the story of  Obama’s presidency.  The f irst involves a
steady—albeit not unif orm—reduction of  large military commitments abroad.  When Obama assumed of f ice
in 2009, he inherited two live wars in Af ghanistan and Iraq and another more nebulous war on terrorism. 
Today, the war in Iraq has ended, Americans are slated to withdraw f rom Af ghanistan in 2014, and the
president has signaled his intention to scale back certain aspects of  the f ight against Islamic extremism. 
Meanwhile, the def ining characteristics of  the f ew new military init iatives promoted by Obama—one in Libya,
another now in Syria—are their limited scope and duration.
The second theme is one of  declining domestic policy inf luence, at least within Congress.  Af ter realizing
some landmark policy achievements at the outset of  his f irst term in of f ice—f rom the f ederal stimulus act
to the Af f ordable Care Act—Obama’s ability to direct domestic policy within Congress has steadily waned. 
When trying now to advance elements of  his domestic policy agenda, most recently on gun control, Obama
regularly trips over opposing f orces throughout our polity.
These two trends—one
involving the phasing out of
war, the other concerning the
president’s decreasing policy ef f ectiveness at home—may be more connected than commonly
acknowledged. Indeed, a venerable tradit ion within polit ical science suggests as much, one that dates back
at least to Alexander Hamilton who wrote in Federalist Paper #8, “it is the nature of  war to increase the
executive at the expense of  the legislative authority.” Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord James Bryce, upon
observing the American system of  government, converged upon similar views, with the latter remarking that
while “the direct domestic authority of  the president is in t ime of  peace very small . . . [in war] in expands
with portentous speed.” At mid-Twentieth Century, the nation’s most f amous presidency scholars—f olks
like Clinton Rossiter and Edward Corwin—wrote book- length treatises emphasizing and elaborating upon
these same themes.
Our recent research evaluates such claims, examining whether the presence of  war leads members of
Congress to vote in ways that better ref lect the president’s pref erences. Investigating every major war
since World War II, we f ind substantial—though not unif orm—evidence of  a wartime ef f ect on
congressional voting behavior. While the outbreaks of  World War II and the war in Af ghanistan led members
of  Congress to vote in ways that better ref lected the sitt ing president’s ideological orientation, the
beginnings of  the Korean and Vietnam wars did not generate especially clear evidence of  congressional
accommodation to the president. On the other hand, when all of  these wars ended, members of  Congress
drif ted away f rom the president’s ideological stance.
Perhaps our most striking f inding concerns the breadth of  congressional accommodation to the president.
Not only do presidents wield increased success on f oreign af f airs during wartime, but presidents also have
greater success on policy matters that concern plainly domestic issues. Hence, when tracking voting
patterns within the 107th Congress bef ore and af ter the September 11 attacks on purely domestic
legislation, we observe a signif icant and substantively large shif t to the ideological right, coinciding with the
ideological orientation of  then-President George W. Bush.  Wars, it would seem, have the capacity to
reshape inter-branch deliberations over much more than just military matters—and they do so, nearly
always, in ways that help the president.
Of  course, not all wars are created alike, and as our results show, not all wars are associated with
equivalent increases in presidential inf luence. The relevance of  war f or presidential success traces back to
the dif f erent perspectives presidents and legislators retain while in of f ice.  Members of  the two branches,
af ter all, represent f undamentally dif f erent constituencies—the president serving the nation as a whole,
and legislators their individual districts.  Legislators, of  course, do not ignore the national interest, but they
must weigh it against the parochial interests of  their districts and states when deciding how to vote on
policy.  The president need not make such a calculation, since, as Woodrow Wilson recognized more than a
century ago, he “is the only national voice in af f airs . . . He is the representative of  no constituency, but of
the whole people.”
Wars have the potential to augment presidential inf luence at home, we argue, because they can change the
very terms under which policy is debated.  When the nation is at war, legislators, like all polit icians, tend to
place more weight on the national considerations relative to local ones.  Debates that once were the
exclusive province of  local considerations are now inf used with talk of  the nation’s security, the shared
f ate of  its cit izens, and the polit ical values that bind them together.  As a result, Congress proves more
willing to def er to the president on matters f oreign and domestic, since the president both knows and
stands to represent what is good f or the country as a whole.  Likewise, when peace is restored, members
of  Congress turn their attention back to their individual districts and states, leading to greater inter-branch
disagreement and thus impeding presidential ambitions.
Recent history provides a good deal of  support f or this argument.  During the major wars of  the last
century, Congress has proven to be much more accommodating to the president’s budgetary
recommendations. At war ’s conclusion, meanwhile, Congress’s enacted appropriations diverge more
substantially f rom the president’s proposed budget. For example, Franklin Roosevelt leveraged World War II
to protect his labor agenda while Eisenhower successf ully sought education ref orms by tying these
ref orms to national security issues raised by the Soviet Union’s launch of  Sputnik.
Our f indings suggest that with the end of  the war in Af ghanistan, Obama’s troubles in Congress may only
get worse. For if  history is any guide, with war ’s end, congressional debates will f eature local concerns
rather than national ones—putting the president at a distinct disadvantage.
This article is based on War, the Presidency, and Legislative Voting Behavior, from the January 2013 issue of
the American Journal of Political Science.
Readers may also be interested in The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of
Threat, published in July 2013, by the University of Chicago Press, and in the authors’ recent Politico
article, “The Syria ef f ect”.
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